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Contemporary labour process analysis (LPA) emphasises the intimate connections between 
transformations of capitalism and trends in work and employment. Within social theory 
influential images of labour such as Reich’s (1993) symbolic analysts or Castell’s (1996) self-
programmable workers, ultimately derive from conception of the broader economy, in this 
case informational capitalism or the knowledge economy. Their diagnosis is based on the 
following assumptions. First, the sources of profit, productivity and power in the new 
economy are said to be (variously) intangible, immaterial or weightless (knowledge, 
creativity, information, intellectual assets). Digital products are reproducible at low cost for 
high returns, enabling capitalism to overcome scarcity and ‘the limits of time and space’ 
(Castells 2001, 5). Second, that knowledge-intensive, intellectual or professional work is 
either in the majority or becoming the majority in advanced post-industrial societies. Third, 
there has been a decisive shift of power from capital to labour given that ‘(knowledge) 
‘remains with the employee and in no real sense is it ever of the firm. It is impossible to 
separate knowledge from the knower’ (Despres and Hiltrop, 1995, p. 11). Fourth, that 
traditional, hierarchical structures and practices of management are no longer appropriate, 
with the best practice being to hire talented people, then leave them alone (Florida 2002, p. 
132). Fifth, corporate forms have mutated into decentralised, flat, networked organisations. 
Extensive critique of these claims have been made elsewhere and we will not repeat them 
here (Thompson et al 2001; Thompson 2004; Thompson and Harley 2012). What we do 
want to do is look in more detail at a related, but newer version that comes under the 
heading of cognitive capitalism, in part because it will facilitate a more extended 
engagement with issues of digital industries and labour.  
 
Theorists of cognitive capitalism influenced by autonomist Marxism (Hardt and Negri 2009; 
Böhm and Land 2011; Moulier Boutang 2012) build on many of these themes. Such claims 
offer a significant challenge to LPA as they defy the idea of material production as a 
privileged site for the value extraction and antagonism between capital and labour. The  
policy agenda offered by more recent popularisers (Mason 2016; Sirnicek and Williams 
2015) shifts even further away from the work terrain in so far as the workplace in itself is no 
longer understood as a place for neither collective nor individual resistance. This chapter 
counters with a detailed exposition and critique of a theories of cognitive or digital 
capitalism. Drawing on our own and other labour process research, within that critique we 
offer some observations towards a more realistic picture of capitalism at work, including the 
importance of financialization of the economy.  
 
 
Cognitive capitalism  
 
Cognitive capitalism theory (CCT) derives from a combination of Italian (post) operaismo1 
and French regulation school influences (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Vercellone 
                                                          
1 Operaismo refers to an intellectual and political tradition that formed in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s and 
whose contemporary prominence is associated largely with the various works of Hardt and Negri. The term 
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2007; Moulier-Boutang 2012; Corsani 2012 and see Turchetto2009; Jeon 2009 and Boffo 
2012 for lineage and variations).  
 
The core of the theory is that cognitive capitalism (CC) is a third type of capitalism (after 
mercantile, industrial) with a distinctive system of accumulation based on knowledge value: 
‘a mode of production in which the object of accumulation consists mainly of knowledge, 
which becomes the basic source of value, as well as the principal location of the process of 
valorisation’. (Moulier Boutang 2012, p. 57). Though CC emerges from the crisis of Fordism, 
theories of post-Fordism are dismissed as rooted in a neo-industrialist vision and relying on 
a traditional approach to the contradictions of capitalism. Instead, the new system of 
accumulation is characterised by a profound transformation of the antagonistic relation of 
capital and labour, and the conflicts that derive from it: The term ‘cognitive brings to light 
the novel nature of labour, the sources of value and the forms of value’ (Lucarelli and 
Vercellone 2013, p. 7). The ‘production of knowledge by knowledge’ therefore puts the 
traditional categories of political economy – value, ownership, production, labour – in crisis 
(Corsani 2001, p. 16). 
 
Value extraction is based on knowledge that cannot be measured, thus value is produced by 
the ‘general intellect’ through socially cooperative labour or outside the workplace in the 
‘commons’ (notably through the web and on-line communities) or by biopolitical labour in 
the production of social life itself (Hardt and Negri 2009; Mason 2016). Because of an 
abundance of use-values, increased returns and minimal cost of reproduction, scarcity 
disappears other than that of time and attention (Moulier Boutang, 2012, p. 66/72). 
Information ‘corrodes value’ in general and price mechanism for digital goods in particular 
(Mason 2016, pp. 142-3). Any account of value based on labour time in production, material 
production or commodity-producing labour is held to be in crisis.2 It is here where we find 
the connection between CCT and ‘post-capitalist’ visions: ‘It is impossible to properly value 
inputs, when they come in the form of social knowledge, knowledge-driven production 
tends towards the unlimited creation of wealth, independent of the labour expended’ 
(Mason 2016,p. 136).  
 
As Boffo (2012, p. 265) notes, for CCT each of the above stages of the historical 
development of capitalism is also associated both with a specific form of division of labour 
and a dominant sector of the economy. With respect to the former, CC, with its increase in 
abstract knowledge and intellectual powers in production is associated with ‘a radical 
change of the subsumption of labour to capital and indicates a third stage of the division of 
labour’ (Vercellone 2007, p. 15). Vercellone frames this change by using Marx’s distinction 
between formal and real subordination of labour. Marx made this distinction to emphasise 
the ways in which capital’s use of machinery and science in what was then the modern 
factory enables new and more powerful mechanisms of control and value extraction, 
                                                          
‘workerism’ relates primarily to the orientation of linking stages of capitalism to figures of labour or class 
composition of labour. Post-operaismo broadly refers to the development of this tradition in a new era after 
Fordism and the mass worker.  
2 Though sceptical of much of the claims of new sources of value in the totality of social life and the ending of 
the distinction between production and reproduction, for space reasons our critique here is focused on 
challenging the arguments that value creation and extraction no longer takes place in or is marginal to the 
labour process and production. This counter-argument does not depend on the Marxian labour theory of 
value.  
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overcoming what was previously just the general control of the employer that lacked the 
means to affect the actual mode of working (Marx 1976, p. 1011). Thus three stages of the 
division of labour are envisaged by Vercellone: formal subsumption of labour in the early 
factory system, real subsumption beginning in the industrial revolution and reaching its 
peak in the standardised mass production and ‘Smithian’ division of labour of the Fordist 
era, and finally the general intellect under CC in which real subsumption is reversed. 
Whereas the concept of formal and real subsumption was developed by Marx through his 
analysis of the labour process in Volume One of Capital, the general intellect is taken from 
the Grundrisse and in particular a series of unfinished notes – ‘The Fragment on Machines’. 
Here it is envisaged that at some time in the future knowledge developed through science 
and technology will become the source of real wealth rather than labour expended in 
production. This would mark the possibility of a transition to communism. For CCT that time 
has arrived. Communism, or at least its preconditions, is already in existence (see Vercellone 
2007, 15), or, with Mason, at least postcapitalist becomes necessary and possible (2015, p. 
xiii)3.  
 
With respect to a dominant sector, ‘the new information technologies, of which the digital, 
the computer, and the Internet are emblematic in the same way in which the coal mine, the 
steam engine, the loom and the railroad were emblematic of industrial capitalism’ (Moulier-
Boutang, 2012, p.57). There is a particular focus on software in general and open source in 
particular as a model of the new capitalism and value production. Mason emphasises the 
growth of ‘non-market production: horizontally distributed peer-production networks, that 
are not centrally managed, producing goods that are either completely free, or – which 
being Open Source – have very limited commercial value’, with Wikepedia as the primary 
example (2016, p. 143), In addition, for some, the creative or cultural industries, particularly 
digital games, play a key role because of the combination of autonomous workers, 
collaborative work and ‘free labour’ in the ‘outernet’ to the networking of human 
intelligence and production of value (Terranova 2000; de Peuter and Dyer-Witherford 2005).  
 
Not only is the division of labour a marker of stages of capitalism, for the operaismo 
tradition labour and labour process dynamics are the primary drivers of development. The 
crisis that ushered in CC was not linked to issues of accumulation or profits, but 
contradictions within capital’s control of the division of labour and the need for capital to 
free itself of the ‘mass worker’ (Vercellone 2007, and see Boffo 2013, p. 264; Turchetto 
2008, p. 294). This tradition is therefore characterised by seeking to identify an emblematic 
figure of labour based on a specific ‘class composition’. For CC, it is immaterial labour; 
defined variously as that which is cerebral, affective, communicative or relational, or that 
which contributes to the informational or cultural content of a commodity (Lazzarato 1996). 
As a result, there is a (qualitative) hegemony of intellectual labour or ‘diffuse intellectuality’. 
Purely physical labour power is consigned to the Fordism and Taylorist era of industrial 
capitalism. Unlike that era, cognition and conception are no longer appropriated by capital, 
and living labour is no longer incorporated into science and machinery (Vercellone 2007, 
16). Rather innovation is captured in interactive cognitive processes of social cooperation: 
‘The main source of value now lies in the creativity, versatility and…invention of employees 
and not in capital assets and in the work of execution’ (Vercellone 2007, p. 25-26). The 
                                                          
3 This argument of the general intellect and the Fragment on Machines is not confined to Vercellone. It is 
shared by Negri, much of the operaisomo tradition (Turchetto 2008, p. 295) and by Mason (2016, pp. 134-5). 
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development of the general intellect is associated with the expansion of mass education, 
which develops alongside the welfare state during Fordism. It is not entirely clear what the 
causal links are between the two. One can only infer that diffuse intellectuality is somehow 
facilitated by the growth and character of educated, graduate, labour. A clue can perhaps be 
seen in Moulier-Boutang’s somewhat naïve statement that, ‘Postgraduates cannot be 
commanded in the same way as high school leavers’ (2012, p. 68).  
 
To the extent that any of these theorists refer concretely to the organisation of work - 
specialisation, standardisation and codification are all decreasing. Reflecting on interactive 
information work, Moulier Boutang asserts that, ‘There is no fixed system that determines 
ex ante the selection of resources to be mobilised on the basis some checklist, the division 
of operations , or the sequence of action with agents at each stage of operations…’ (2012, p. 
65). Assertions of autonomous immaterial labour are also linked to claims concerning 
measurement or more precisely its absence. Reinforcing he previous argument about labour 
time no longer being linked to value, autonomous labour is and is ‘outside measurement’ 
and beyond management: ‘Immaterial labour is immeasurable because being measured 
means being imposed, which is in diametrical opposition to its being flexible, creative and 
communicative. Labour becomes life itself’ (Jeon 2009, p. 6).  
 
Moulier-Boutang links the rise of living labour to a decline of managerial interest in 
individual performance in the workplace (2012, p. 54). Meanwhile Vercellone (2007,p. 33) 
repeats the previously-noted knowledge economy argument that ‘In cognitive-labour 
producing knowledge, the result of labour remains incorporated in the brain of the worker 
and is thus inseparable from the knower’. As for any engagement with ideas of managerial 
hierarchy or the firm, it is to repeat post-Fordist and mainstream business notions of the 
horizontalization of corporate forms; an economy of variety and learning organisations; 
small series of production (Moulier-Boutang 2012, p. 69) and networks displacing markets 
and hierarchies, except with an emphasis on digitalization (see Moulier-Boutang 2012,pp. 
61-5). Mason also refers to the ‘age of the network’ and ‘Everything comes down to the 
struggle between network and hierarchy, between old forms of society moulded around 
capitalism and new forms of society that prefigure what comes next’ (2016, p. xix).  
 
Despite the Marxist language, it is irrefutable that there are many similarities to prior new 
economy narratives4. A partial critique of the contradictions of cognitive capitalism 
emphasises the efforts by capital to offset the losses incurred in the law of value in 
production by enforcing it elsewhere. Capital uses its monopoly position in networks to 
manufacture scarcity through the extraction of rents based largely on intellectual property 
(see Vercellone 2007, pp. 33-34), or expropriates value produced in the wider society from 
the ‘general intellect’. The distinction between profit and rent collapses and capital 
becomes purely ‘parasitic’ (see Boffo 2012, p. 261). One perceived consequence is that 
antagonism is displaced from the labour process and employment relationship and ‘the 
class struggle in cognitive capitalism increasingly takes the form of a distribution struggle’ 
(Jeon 2010: 19). In slightly different terms, politics shifts from the factory to the social 
                                                          
4 In Empire, Hardt and Negri borrow wholesale from such sources (see Thompson 2005). The continuity is even 
more stark in Mason whose ‘Prophets of Post Capitalism’ chapter includes positive expositions of Peter 
Drucker, Kevin Kelly and Jeremy Rifkin, writings whose relationship to the reality of contemporary capitalism is 
somewhat distant (Mason 2015, pp. 109-45).  
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factory, radical demands focusing on a universal basic income and full automation replacing 
the ‘drudgery’ of wage labour (Mason 2016; Snirceck and Williams 2015). There are few 
discussions of increased precariousness in the labour market and devaluation of labour 
power, but they remain relatively marginal to the main argument5.  
 
Social theory meets social facts 
 
It would be insufficient to critique CCT empirically as ‘it is not about the validity of facts and 
numbers, but how they are interpreted’ (Jeon 2010, p. 3). And certainly CCT is cavalier in 
dismissing evidence based criticisms on the grounds that hegemony might not actually be 
dominance, but the start of something or the directionality of trends (Moulier-Boutang 
2012, p. 54 / 60). But the latter’s contempt for the ‘empirical approach’ should not go 
unchallenged, for two reasons. First, specific empirical claims are made about trends that 
can be challenged on their own terms. Second, because CCT is all too typical of the 
sweeping generalisations, unrepresentative exemplary industries and absence of plausible 
evidence that characterises much of the recent social theorising about capitalism. We will 
challenge the general arguments and assumptions contained in the CCT narrative by 
focusing on key trends in capital, employment and the division of labour.  
 
Actually existing capital 
Immaterial or cognitive knowledge materialises as a location of the process of valorisation. 
Yet we are told little or nothing about how capital is actually organised in companies or 
value chains, or how companies make their money through particular business models. Of 
equal importance, CCT overestimates the extent to which capitalism is defined and 
dominated by internet-based companies. If we look at data about which industries and firms 
dominate the global economy, it was in 2011 that for the first time a technology firm, 
namely Apple, overtook EXXON. In 2016, we find that Google’s parent company Alphabet, 
Apple, Microsoft and Facebook are the world’s most profitable companies (Myers 2016). 
However, they are far from being the largest either by revenue or capitalisation, let alone by 
employees; and many of the other ‘exemplary’ internet firms are marginal, with Uber and 
AirBnB not even showing up in the Fortune Global 500 list. In sum, global capitalism is 
dominated by energy, finance and telecoms/utilities. At European level financial services 
and supermarkets are strongly represented. In the UK, the story is similar, but with two 
global tobacco companies making the top twenty.  
 
Of course, such lists are limited in their explanatory value and some of the activities 
producing profits for such firms will be knowledge-driven or internet-coordinated. But if 
anyone examines how Exxon Mobil, Wal-Mart or Toyota makes its money, it does offer a 
major corrective to the CCT narrative of immaterial production or zero cost reproduction6 at 
                                                          
5 An exception is Snirceck and Williams (2015) for whom precarity and breakdown of stable jobs are a central 
feature of the crisis of work and emergence of a ‘surplus population’. 
6 ‘Zero cost reproduction’ and immaterial production still depend on rather material worlds, examples are the 
ongoing and aggressive extractivism (with fracking but its latest turn), making sure basic crude materials most 
are available. The precision of new robots is available only by moulding plastic; processors rely on rare earth 
compounds; the power for cloud computing still stems from centralised energy production systems; robots still 
are a cost-intensive investment ($60,000 up to $150,000); last not least, companies still get hold of intellectual 
property rights. 
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the heart of economic value. The global dimension and the dynamics of value chains are 
also a key consideration. The example of Apple, Foxconn and the IPad is revealing. Apple’s 
operating profit margin and stock market valuation is highly dependent on a business model 
based on cost control through the supply chain (Froud et al 2014) and specifically, very low 
direct labour costs in suppliers (Cleland 2014). Foxconn is compelled to pass on the burden 
of cost adjustment through speed-up, contract manipulation and various forms of free 
labour (including unpaid overtime and the dormitory labour system). In his critique of 
Mason, Fuchs sums up the picture effectively, ‘This analysis overestimates information 
economy because capitalism is not just digital and informational capitalism, but at the same 
time financial capitalism, hyper-industrial, fossil fuel capitalism, mobilities capitalism etc’ 
(Fuchs 2016, p. 232). He goes on to refute Mason’s claim that value has collapsed in the 
digital sector, pointing to profits made on the basis of product innovation, exploitation of 
direct and indirect labour and (most significantly) targeted advertising. It is simply not true 
that ‘capitalism can no longer adapt to technological change’, as new ways to monetise and 
monopolise in those social media and Web 2.0 sectors show (Tyfield 2015; Coonawara 
2015).  
 
A key trend across all sectors is the concentration of capital. In contrast to the fantasy of the 
global commons, concentration is particularly marked in virtual and vertical integration 
internet-based or new media (Fitzgerald 2015). As Andrew Keen (2014) observes, the 
internet, contrary to images of a sharing economy, has proven to be the perfect vehicle for 
free market capitalism – a ‘networked kleptocracy’. Mason notes the existence of ‘info-
monopolies’, but beyond asserting that it is a ‘defence mechanism’ finds it difficult to 
explain if the ‘spontaneous tendency’ of information and the internet is to ‘dissolve markets 
and destroy ownership’ (2016, p. xiv). It seems to us the reverse is true. Peer production and 
genuine sharing economy projects exist in specialist niches, whilst digital platforms such as 
Uber and AirBnB develop hierarchical business models that invade and seek to dominate 
more traditional markets. It is telling that it is hard to find any substantive, collaborative 
peer production example in Mason other than Wikipedia.  
 
Employment - Jobs trends and the scope of digital labour 
 
The hegemony of cognitive labour is difficult to spot amongst statistics on employment.  
Table 1 gives an overview from the Bureau of Labour Statistics for projected US job growth. 
This indicates that growth will be based largely on the expansion of personal services, retail 
and hospitality – sectors that are associated with significant skills under-utilisation (Wright 
and Sissons 2012).   CCT could argue that much of this work, whilst lacking ‘intellectual’ 
content abounds with the other immaterial dimension of affectivity and allowing for the 
general intellect to flourish. However, the positive spin by CCT seems to ignore the weight of 
evidence concerning the growing regulation and standardisation of emotional and aesthetic 
labour power (see Warhurst et al 2009). Indeed it is ironic given the casting of physicality 
back into the Fordist era that so much interactive service work draws on embodied 
capacities in labour power (Wolkowitz and Warhurst 2010). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Returning to general trends, a UK report (Wilson et al 2014) estimated that the proportion 
of low and middle skilled jobs in 2022 would be 71 per cent - almost no change from the 
2012 figure. Of course, as Table 1 shows, there is also job growth among some categories of 
professional, managerial and technical labour confirming long-established observations 
concerning polarised labour markets (Goos and Manning 2007). Scepticism concerning 
‘mass intellectuality’ is reinforced by reports of a discrepancy between the number of 
graduates and ‘graduate jobs’ in both the US and UK (CIPD 2015). In a commentary on the 
US figures, Bernick (2012) observes that ‘the main point remains from these projections that 
most jobs in the emerging economy are not ones requiring college degrees and above’.  
It may be objected that these are US and UK figures and it’s true that we need a global 
picture. Why not start with the fact that there are almost 100 million manufacturing jobs in 
China alone (The Globalist, 2014)? As feminist, and post-colonial critics have noted (see 
Federici 2004 and Huws 2007) a dynamic analysis of the changing global divisions of labour 
is more global picture is precisely what is missing in CCT.  
 
What of the employment trends concerning digital-related labour itself? Given the 
pervasiveness of digital tools and means of communication, there is a tendency to make 
inflated claims for its scope and coverage (e.g. Fuchs 2014, p. 352). Though by no means 
comprehensive, we would distinguish between three overlapping categories. First there is 
what we would describe as core digital labour defined in terms of creating and maintaining 
digital commodities, including software, games workers and parts of the ‘creative class’. 
Whilst the relevant industries generate significant amounts of value, they do so largely on 
the basis of smaller, specialised labour forces. For example, the games industry in the UK 
currently generates £1.02bn contribution to GDP, yet it employs just 9896 workers in games 
development and up to 18,000 indirectly. Even more starkly, WhatsApp only needs about 50 
employees to reach its 900million users worldwide (Metz 2015).  
 
The second category encompasses work that is allocated and/or organised through digital 
platforms. This is often associated with crowdsourcing, which is clearly a qualitative change 
with regard to employment relations (see Howcroft and Bergvall-Kareborn, this volume), 
but with different business models. At one end of the spectrum, mostly non-digital labour is 
recruited and organised through digital platforms to provide services to individuals or 
organisations such as TaskRabbit (from cleaning to moving to repair services) and Uber. On 
the other, companies – whether digital or not - outsource work through a kind of 
‘internalized offshoring’ (Silverman 2014, p. 108). Much of the content – through platforms 
such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk – consists of microtasks, often with low skill and training 
requirements, and minimal rewards). However, platforms can also host contests for jobs 
with medium range complexity (translating articles; customer services) and even high-end 
jobs such as software development that are better compensated. Across the spectrum, the 
platforms offer the possibility of internationalising the available skill pool and evade 
national labour standards (Holts 2013).  This is an important new trend, but again it is worth 
being cautious about the scope. According to a World Bank report on online outsourcing, 
there is an estimated 48 million worker registered on crowdsourcing platforms, but with 
only around approximately ten per cent actively participating (2015, p. 9).  
 
The third category includes the large amount of routine labour employed directly by or in 
digital sectors.  This includes, for example, ‘behind the click’ workers employed by the e-tail 
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giants in Amazon and other warehouse, distributive and logistics centres, who use digital 
tools to keep the ‘value in motion’ (Newsome 2015). Alternatively, a UK Government report 
(DCMS 2014) estimates that though the proportion of jobs in the whole of the ‘creative 
economy’ – is at 8.5 per cent of total employment and growing, almost one third (2.55m) 
were classified as ‘non creative’.  
 
The essential point being made here is that digital-related labour is of growing significance, 
but heterogeneous in content and context and uneven in any relationship to intellectual 
labour. The latter point is further illustrated in the next section.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Division of labour - Cognition, control and measurement 
 
CCT relies heavily on claims concerning the division of labour. Assertions of spontaneous 
social cooperation and autonomy bear little relationship to any workplace research we are 
aware of. European surveys report uneven trends concerning levels of employee discretion, 
Curbing creativity: The case of the games industry 
The games industry is often regarded as exemplary of changes in the cognitive 
division of labour, the rise of autonomous, immaterial work and and the 
blurring of work/play boundaries (O’Doherty and Wilmott 2009; De Peuter and 
Dyer-Witherford 2005). Games workers are certainly an example of what we 
described earlier as ‘core digital labour’ involved in the production of digital 
commodities. Yet is we examine the largest component – console games – a 
very different picture emerges than one of autonomous, networker firms and 
workers. Digital games is a multi-billion dollar global industry. In terms of its 
value chain, there is a complex but heavily weighted struggle for value capture 
between console manufacturers and/or publishers, development studios and 
retailers. Game publishers such as Microsoft or Electronic Arts use their 
concentrated market power, access to finance and greater mobility/switching 
capacity to extract value in the chain, notably in the form of intellectual 
property and transfer of costs and risk. (Johns 2006). When it comes to 
employment relations, drawing on extensive research (Parker, Cox and 
Thompson 2014; Thompson, Parker and Cox 2015) it is possible to track how 
publishers can use digitalised technologies to outsource work to an increasingly 
spatially dispersed firms or ‘development studio’s. Sources of tension and 
conflict are then embedded in the contractual process. Managing this contract 
variation therefore creates significant budgeting and time scheduling pressures. 
The studio owners cannot meet the burden of that risk and the targets imposed 
by the lead firms without transferring a large portion of the risks to labour. 
Whilst the labour process does indeed involve creative cooperation, it is 
increasingly specialised and very far from unmanaged and improvised. Given 
that there are enhanced pressures for greater work intensity and pressure to 
‘do more with less’, the above research found absolutely no evidence of the 
blurring of work and play. In fact even asking the question of interviewees was 
to invite scorn.  
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with the majority of countries largely rather static or falling (Green 2006).7 The autonomy 
argument is intimately linked to those concerning (the absence of) time and measurement. 
Labour time remains a fundamental focus of managerial attention. Indeed the use of 
tracking and monitoring software provides tools that FW Taylor could only have dreamed of. 
Nor is it confined to call centres and the minute measurement of call handling times. 
Amazon is known to use a digital platform that is multi-faceted, (Bergvall-Kåreborn and 
Howcroft, 2014) thus serving several ends simultaneously: vendors access to display and sell 
their wares, end customers can gain access to information on purchase and delivery status. 
This allows Amazon to evaluate the quantities required against in-stock availability, and 
managers can assess the “hourly flow of workers required in each part of the FC, 
supervisory can monitor associates in real-time (productivity, time targets errors etc.)”, and 
they are able to text messages to the handheld devices that navigate the workers through 
the warehouse (Briken et al 2016, p.10) As one worker put it: “…the targets are in your face 
– literally – every second, of every minute, of every day (Maddy S)” (Briken et al 2016, p.11). 
Or, more bluntly in the words of an Amazon manager: “You’re sort of like a robot, but in 
human form,” said the Amazon manager. ‘It’s human automation, if you like’. (Financial 
Times, February 8, 2013) 
 
Measurement in the service of a calculative rationality is thus wider than the question of 
labour time. The recent growth of ‘people analytics’ has been described in The Wall Street 
Journal as a trend that ‘treats the humans in an organisation just like any other asset in the 
supply chain, as something that can be monitored, analysed and reconfigured’ (Mims 2015). 
This can be considered a small aspect of the wider increase in performance management in 
large organisations. With respect to crowdsourcing platforms discussed earlier, Silverman 
notes that ‘Everything they do is tracked’ and that ‘crowdsourced workers are expected to 
work seamslessly with software, following its commands’ (2014, p. 108-9).  In the private 
sector, it is primarily linked to cascading and often punitive targets, aided in many cases by 
electronic monitoring and tighter work flow (Taylor 2013, pp. 46-7). In the public sector, 
targets have accompanied the rise in ‘new public management’, but are also present in the 
spread of audit and accountability measures. What has become fashionably known as 
knowledge management (KM) is also part of enhanced performance exposure. KM is 
particularly significant in knowledge-intensive industries, the supposed heartland of creative 
and cooperative labour. Of course these characteristics are present, but alongside the use of 
IT systems to capture, convert and codify the tacit knowledge of expert labour in order to 
speed up the innovation or molecule to market process (McKinlay 2005). This is the 
common language used in the KM field and somewhat skewers the naïve view that 
knowledge cannot be appropriated from the mind of the intellectual worker.  
 
The use of IT systems to capture tacit knowledge is now part of a widespread recognition of 
the emergence of digital or knowledge-based Taylorism. In manufacturing this is driven by 
the development of engineering systems that allow global operating companies to 
‘calculate, to compare and to standardise processes worldwide’ (Westkämpfer 2007, p. 6). 
Brown et al (2011) refer to digital Taylorism as the extraction, codification and digitalisation 
of knowledge into software prescripts and working knowledge that underpins the global 
                                                          
7 According to the first findings available from the Sixth European Working Conditions survey, we can see a 
slight increase compared to 2005 (Eurofund 2015, p. 7). However, this is not yet included in the positive 
changes mentioned in the reports summary.  
Commented [KB1]: Might check for an updated source since 
this is ten years old? 
Commented [KB2R1]: So I included the latest figures – see 
footnote below. OK? YES, but why not just give the reference and 
delete the footnote?  
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auction of cheaper, high quality high skilled labour.). We also know that artificial intelligence 
and algorithms can incorporate living labour into machine systems. At the moment this is 
largely confined to mid-level jobs based on collection and analysis of information, but it has 
the capacity, as noted in a radio interview with McAfee to ‘outsource cognitive labour’ (BBC 
Radio 4, 2015). 8  
 
Conceptual confusions 
Beyond linking these empirical limitations, a number of conceptual confusions are worth 
highlighting. First, despite references to systems of accumulation, the (post) operaismo 
legacy is of defining capitalism by stages in the division of labour or the dominant ‘figure of 
labour’. On the latter, moving from the mass worker through various intermediary 
categories to the contemporary ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri) or the collective worker of the 
general intellect’ (Vercellone), the result is a politicised version of value in search of ‘the 
transcendental political subject in struggle against capital’ (Boffo, 2012,p. 279). On the 
wider question, defining a stage of capitalism – real subsumption – that spans more than 
150 years highlights the flaws in using the division of labour as the focal point. Whilst 
sociologists of work and the economy should always try to identify the ways in which 
capitalist political economy and the labour process are articulated, history teaches us that 
accumulation regimes are compatible with significant differences in the organisation of 
work and employment and, therefore, the frontier of control in the workplace. Leading 
contributors to CCT may try and justify their claims through Marx.  
 
‘Read(ing) the structure of capital’ through the struggles of labour (Vercellone 2007,p. 25) 
leads to the second issue – the disappearing capital trick. This absence is exacerbated by 
designating capital as purely parasitic, with accumulation taking place through rent-seeking 
rather than profit in production. In taking this position CCT diminishes capital’s power and 
evades any attempt to analyse its actual workings. It is true that in some sectors, intellectual 
property is a source of value capture, but rent-seeking through monopoly is not a new 
feature of capitalism and nor does it exhaust how firms use their power in markets and 
value chains. The choice to focus on value extraction through rent-seeking or outside 
production and in the ‘totality of social life’ is also at odds with contemporary employer 
attacks on the wages and conditions of labour (Boffo 2012,p. 267) and as we have already 
demonstrated, the continuing centrality of extracting value from labour in supply chains.  
 
Contemporary capitalism is not just read through labour, but through the labour theory of 
value, or more precisely its abolition in an era in which value and labour time cease to have 
relevance as knowledge is socialised and governed by the general intellect. Mason has a 
long defence of the labour theory of value up until the point where info goods and their 
associated effects throw capitalism into crisis and provide the basis for a transition to post-
capitalism. Along with the autonomists, this argument is derived, as indicated earlier, from 
The Fragment on Machines. Whatever the validity of Marx’s arguments about the 
development of science, technology and automation as a basis for a transition to a post-
                                                          
8 Beaudry et al argue that an increase in such tasks is required during the period of investment in the new IT 
systems, but ‘once the new capital is in place, cognitive task workers are only needed to maintain the new 
capital.’ (Beaudry 2013, p. 2) 
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capitalist future, it is clear that we are far from this point. As we have shown, not only is 
much of value capture taking place in traditional ways and through non-digital sectors, and 
capital has been extremely successful in finding new ways to valorise new ICTs and social 
media, both within and outside the labour process (Pitts 2015; Tyfield 2015). Without this 
understanding the arguments lead to determinism and/or utopianism as mentioned by a 
number of his critics (Fuchs 2016: 237; Pitts 2015), attributing to (Info) technology 
transformative powers - in this case to dissolve markets and ownership – that it does not 
and cannot independently possess. 
 
Finally, the misapprehension of the present is sustained by a misreading of the past – 
notably the designation of the ‘industrial stage’ of capitalism as based on physical labour., 
‘devoid of any intellectual or creative quality’ (Vercellone 2007, p. 24). As Jeon (2010, p. 15) 
notes, ‘industrial and cognitive labour are contrasted to each other to the extent that 
appear as if mutually exclusive’. As Marx (1977, p. 270) noted, labour power is always an 
‘aggregate of those physical and mental qualities’. Over-emphasis on the role of knowledge 
now is matched by its underestimation in the past. Not only were there significant numbers 
of design, engineering or other conceptual jobs under Fordism, those involved primarily in 
execution still contained tacit knowledge that employers are now seeking to identify and 
leverage (Warhurst and Thompson 2006).  
 
Financialization, capital and the digital 
To use a term to define the character or essential logic of capitalism in general or at a 
particular stage is a very large claim. It is, as we have demonstrated with respect to 
cognitive, informational or digital, both contentious and flawed. With respect to digital, this 
more accurately refers to particular commodities, sectors or tools used by a wider range of 
companies.  In contrast we would highlight financialization as the central dynamic in 
contemporary capitalist political economy (Thompson 2013; Van der Zwan 2014).  Though it 
can be conceptualised in varied and broader ways, we endorse the perspective that refers 
to a finance-dominated regime of accumulation, with the emphasis on a shift in the 
interconnections and pattern of dominance in the industrial and financial circuits of capital 
(Stockhammer 2008; Müller 2013; Demirovic and Sablowski, 2013). The scope of this 
concept includes both the role of financial assets in macro-economic patterns of growth and 
household behaviour and the micro-economic consequences of partially financialized 
accumulation at the level of the firm and the labour process. These dynamics are, of course, 
always uneven and contested, especially with respect of national political economies to 
incentivise or constrain the opportunities of financial agents (Engelen and Konings 2010: 
618).  
 
Within some of the core texts of CCT discussed in this chapter there are occasional and brief 
mentions of financialization (e.g. Vercellone 2007, p. 23; Moulier Boutang 2012, p. 48), but 
they are marginal to the central arguments and (given the GFC) inconsistent with 
assumptions about the relative stability of a new system of accumulation (Moulier Boutang 
212, p. 58). A partial exception amongst autonomist writers is Marazzi’s (2010) account of 
the ‘violence of financial capitalism’.  However, whilst correctly identifying the unstable 
nature of accumulation, Marazzi persists with the theme that sees contemporary value 
capture as external to production. In this instance, finance becomes a further device to 
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capture value produced either in social life/consumption, or in branding and intellectual 
property rights. The latter is indeed an important source of value under financialization 
(Willmott, 2010), but this argument fails to understand the continuing intimate connections 
between financialization, material production and the labour process. This holds true for 
Masons’ (2015) occasional discussion of financialization. Here it is presented largely as an 
additional income stream for firms whose sources of profits through traditional business 
models are squeezed, and for workers facing wage squeeze, debt and in need of credit.   
 
 CCT thus follows the dominant policy discourse and relies on the contrast between financial 
institutions – notably new investment funds such as private equity – and their often 
speculative and predatory behaviours, with the real, productive economy. This distinction is 
largely illusory as non-financial corporations are themselves financialized in terms of their 
ownership, investment patterns and trade in financial assets (Clark and Macey 2015; Cushen 
and Thompson 2016). Capital market actions and actors thus increasingly drive firm 
behaviour rather than merely act as financial intermediaries. Some accounts of the pursuit 
of shareholder value tend to focus on redistribution processes, including increasing investor 
returns via dividends, share buybacks, taking on debt, and reducing internal investment and 
costs. Amongst the noted effects are perpetual restructuring, disposability of corporate 
assets, and a bias for short-term financial engineering and value extraction, and against 
operational capability and innovation. Various studies have noted the increased gap 
between the rate of return on manufacturing investment and the rate of return on financial 
assets (Milburg, 2009). Whereas the loyalty of corporate executives is secured through 
share option based rewards, the influence of weakening of unit-level managerial layers and 
levers is weakened. Of equal importance the weight of evidence is that financialization is 
destructive of the kinds of organisational innovation that CCT proclaims as the source of 
knowledge value, even in knowledge-intensive firms (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013; Gleadle 
et al 2014).  
 
Of course digital/informational tools and techniques facilitate financial flows, 
measurements and transactions. An example would be capital market valuation 
methodologies to measure performance, and aid the setting of financial targets in decision 
making. However, as the business analyst Simon Caulkin (2014) notes, the effects are largely 
negative, ‘the management innovation that is needed will not come from new 
communication and coordinating technologies (such as big data, the internet of things or 
social media). In fact, the reverse is true. In today’s financialized world, these are more likely 
to be used to accentuate the job-stripping, winner takes-all trend already seen with 
pervious techniques of outsourcing and offshoring. To return to the issue of value capture in 
the labour process, it is important to understand why and how these processes of 
financialized investment feed through to budgeting processes through which targets 
relating to revenue growth and cost cutting can be disseminated and measured. As Cushen 
and Thompson (2016) explain, these rely strongly on cost controls, with implications for 
labour and the labour process. This manifests itself in two main ways. First, cost recovery 
through taking labour out, outsourcing, work intensification and a downward squeeze on 
wages. Second, a shift in control mechanisms with an increase in the extent, intensity and 
punitive character of performance management. These are frequently linked to ‘managed 
exits’ of sections of the labour force and reflect the ratcheting down of financialized 
corporate profit targets (Clark and Macey 2015). Amongst the consequences for labour and 
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its management are increased job and role insecurity associated with perpetual 
restructuring and reorganisation, and falling levels of employee engagement and 
attachment, with corresponding increases in cynicism and dissent.  
 
Some concluding comments 
Significant transformation has taken place in the workings of capitalism and some of those 
have been facilitated by digitalisation, including new sources of value and types of 
employment relation. However, our general examination of CCT reveals that it repeats most 
of the analytical mistakes of speculative grand narratives: stages as complete ruptures with 
the past; exemplary but atypical industries and work; technological determinism and 
utopianism; evidence-light speculation. In his trenchant critique of ‘post-workerism’, 
Graeber observes that it is ‘less interested in describing realities than in bringing them into 
being’ (2008, p. 13). The tendency to let the political goals drive or displace the empirical 
investigation is repeated in much of recent the post-work commentary (Mason 2016; 
Srnicek and Williams 2015). For example, after a series of definitive claims about emergent 
job-destorying automation, the latter admit that ‘Our argument here relies largely on a 
normative claim rather than a descriptive one. Full automation is something that can and 
should be achieved, regardless if whether it is being carried out’ (Srnicek and Williams  
2015, p. 117)  
 
Hence our critique of CCT has focused on what we believe to be going on in firms, work and 
labour markets. What we have given less consideration to is the more recent shift in 
autonomist-influenced and related claims that the rise of robot and AI-driven automation 
signals the end of any meaningful politics of production. It is true that some routine, mid-
level and higher value jobs are vulnerable to the impact of AI and robotics in the next few 
decades (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Bank of England 2015). However, that has to be set 
against the fact that in mid-2016 the UK employment rate (at 74.2%) was the joint highest 
since comparable records began in 1971 (Inman 2016). In a caustic critique of Mason, the 
radical economist Doug Henwood (2015) says that there is no evidence that info tech is 
substantially diminishing the amount of work needed and points to the fact that 
employment expansion in the US is even stronger than GDP growth models would suggest.  
With current trends in mind, it seems a very large number of steps to projections of a post 
work world.9  
 
The figures in Table 1 also underline that in many of the jobs where there is a significant 
upward trend, notably in human services, they will not be easy to replace by robots given 
their often interactive and affective character.  Given that knowledge-intensive and high 
discretion jobs are also unlikely to be automated, the roles with the most likely vulnerability 
are those (such as insurance underwriters and travel agents) where software can automate 
information search and manipulation. With respect to robots, manufacturing remains the 
main immediate market for robotics.  According to the World Robotics 2015 report, the 
number of robot installations has increased heavily as since 2010. However, this does not 
                                                          
9 We are aware that the employment rates are contested. Looking at the global data published by the 
Worldbank, we see a global decline with some countries even increasing their participation rates. So far, the 
decline in some countries (China) is explained more accurately by economic crisis and not by technological 
determinism (Worldbank 2016). 
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put into question the growth model for developing countries – low wages, cheap labour - in 
the near future.  In developing economies, rather than replacing human labour, technology 
is more likely to enhance and augment human potentials (see Pfeiffer xxx in this volume). 
With robots becoming more dexterous, and are safe enough to work alongside people, 
there will for sure be an increase in Human-Robot-Collaboration (Bauer et al. 2008). Also, 
data gloves and data glasses will be used to increase quality (and potentially workers’) 
control.   
 
At this stage we don’t know enough to predict with any certainty how many jobs software-
driven automation and robotisation will eliminate, augment, decompose  or create new 
demands for. What we do know is the stock of work in any economy  is not fixed (Stewart et 
al 2015). It is also worth remembering that we have been here before with previous waves 
of technological determinist predictions from futurists and other ideational entrepreneurs 
of the ‘end of work’ (e.g. Rifkin 1995). Such determinism not only lacks a sound empirical 
basis, but an appreciation of agency. To avoid the same mistakes, analysis of the future role 
of the digital in capitalism needs to embrace an understanding of the varied contexts, power 
relations, choices and decision structures, and capacity for resistance.  This has always been 
a strong point of labour process research. In contrast, rationales for a politics of 
postcapitalism and post-work rest on extremely pessimistic readings of the struggles of 
waged workers. In recent accounts from Mason (2016) and Srnicek and Williams (2015) the 
working class (in both developed and developing economies) is presented as fragmented, 
divided and in thrall to consumption and debt, whilst the labour movement is largely 
defeated, demoralised and sclerotic. In doing so, they dismiss the diverse, actual struggles 
and concerns of labour. It is vital to understand the content of those concerns and actions.  
Contrary to the claim that, ‘For the vast majority of people, work offers no meaning, 
fulfilment or redemption’ (Srnircek and Williams 2015, p. 117), survey and qualitative 
research indicates simultaneous positive attachments to work and work identity, but 
critique of and anger about insecurity, recognition, under-employment, work intensification, 
depressed wages and unfair rewards (see Findlay and Thompson forthcoming ; XXX this 
volume).  It is here where the discussion about digitisation and robotisation needs to be 
connected to real work experiences. Workers are critical about their jobs and how work is 
organised, but there is evidence that they want those concrete problems addressed rather 
than dismissed Fordist nostalgia.  
. 
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Table 1: Job growth US labour market 2014-2024 
 
 
**bold: high(er) skilled knowledge/creative work; italic: manual work;   
Total, all 
occupations 
9,788.90 
in %  
 
6.5 
Personal care aides 458.1 25.9 
Registered nurses 439.3 16.0 
Home health aides 348.4 38.1 
Combined food preparation and serving workers, including fast 
food 
343.5 10.9 
Retail salespersons 314.2 6.8 
Nursing assistants 262.0 17.6 
Customer service representatives 252.9 9.8 
Cooks, restaurant 158.9 14.3 
General and operations managers 151.1 7.1 
Construction laborers 147.4 12.7 
Accountants and auditors 142.4 10.7 
Medical assistants 138.9 23.5 
Janitors and cleaners, except maids and housekeeping cleaners 136.3 5.8 
Software developers, applications 135.3 18.8 
Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand 125.1 5.1 
First-line supervisors of office and administrative support workers 121.2 8.3 
Computer systems analysts 118.6 20.9 
Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses 117.3 16.3 
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 111.7 7.7 
Medical secretaries 108.2 20.5 
Management analysts 103.4 13.6 
Heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers 98.8 5.5 
Receptionists and information clerks 97.8 9.5 
Office clerks, general 95.8 3.1 
Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing, except 
technical and scientific products 
93.4 6.4 
Stock clerks and order fillers 92.9 4.9 
Market research analysts and marketing specialists 92.3 18.6 
First-line supervisors of food preparation and serving workers 88.5 9.9 
Electricians 85.9 13.7 
Maintenance and repair workers, general 83.5 6.1 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016), own table 
